During the seventeenth century, the whole of Europe witnessed and experienced the transformation of the French state into an absolute monarchy. The might of the king of France knew no bounds, as he removed all restrictions to his executive authority, and the power of the state consolidated into his hands. All actions and operations of the state of France emanated for the crown. In effect, the king become the center of French governance and both other branches of government and political actors but an extension of his will. These powers even extended to the judiciary and legislative, which created the laws that all French men must abide. The laws of the land remained the laws of the king. This form of governance produced a monarchy that remained unquestioned by all, and need not answer to any other than the monarch’s own absolute will. Thus, of all the absolute monarchies of France, only one has stood as the true creator and representation of this centralized state, Louis XIV.
In this stage, the lead role and true affirmer and perpetuator of the absolute state is none other than Louis XIV. The core aim of his rule centered to finish what his father, Louis XIII, and his father’s chief minister, Cardinal Richelieu, had started. Both reduced the power of the nobility to influence matters of the state and decreased the parliaments' ability to pass laws. This led to the series of civil wars known as the Fronde that stretched from 1648 to 1653. These civil wars struck at the heart of France during Louis XIV’s youth.[1] As the state of France became strained by a failing economy, the nobility and parliaments took to arms so to regain the powers that Richelieu and Louis XIII had restricted and reduced. This desire to return the powers of the representative body of the Parliament of Paris led a group of Parisians to force their way into the royal palace.[2] Though Louis XIV remained physically unharmed, the event forever altered his perception of the role of the king. This role being the center of power so that no group, foreign or domestic, could threaten the crown. Under the direct rule of Louis XIV, he further diminished the powers of the nobility and parliaments. This degradation reached the point that one became his pawns (nobility) and the other his puppets (parliaments), but both simply husks of their former selves. Thus, the French monarchy became truly absolute and the whole of Europe trembled to the might of the Sun King.
The marvel of statesmanship that Louis XIV used to create his absolute state did not go unnoticed. Many a foreign monarchy desired and aimed to achieve what Louis had done. In the state of England, the king, Charles II, lacked the powers that Louis XIV possessed because of the English parliament reduced the powers of the king. Charles remained but a figurehead within the state that he was meant to rule. The position of Charles II emulates the position of other European monarchies found themselves in. These monarchies either lacked the means to eliminate the restrictions on their rule or the strength of bodies that restrained them too strong to repel. For these reasons, other states glorified Louis XIV’s rule. This same trend found root in France over the generations as Louis’ court admired his magnetism and later French descendants glorified him. Though Louis used brute force and tactics of intimidation to bend others to his will, he has been painted as the one who brought France to renown. For in the end history is solely written by the victors and Louis XIV truly remains the champion that brought both France and Europe to its knees.
The victory of Louis XIV over his domestic and foreign rivals than becomes puzzling. For what allowed Louis to act to reduce the powers of the nobility and the parliaments? Furthermore, in taking on the expense to subjugate them to his will, how did he control the public from erupting into chaos? Moreover, once all had been made under his control then how did Louis do the same to his foreign rivals in Europe. In thinking on these questions, I have concluded the answer rested in the standardization of the French military. That this social institution allowed Louis to subdue his enemies. This seemed the obvious choice because the use of force, if enough is applied, will cause one’s foes to submit. Also, in creating a standardized military, it remained loyal solely to the king and no other. This is especially so for the members of the court, as during the Middle Ages and before the Fronde the armies of France owed loyalty to their lords. Thus, the almighty military of France served to enforce and carry out the will of the king, and to act as the blade and shield of the crown. Then, this answer led me to the central question that this paper aims to answer, how did the military serve, as a social institution, to allow Louis XIV to create and maintain an absolute monarchy?
The answer to this central question I will address it in two different sections, domestic and foreign affairs. The standardization of the military into a professionalized force created a new breed of institution rooted in tradition and new functional practices. This is seen in Louis’ continued use of the nobility as officers, but also the new financial system he put in place. The system developed a military culture that led the officers to have absolute loyalty to the king for it is he that they owed their positions, prestige, and revenue. Then, Louis used the military to threaten the parliaments so that if they did not obey the military would crush them. The result they feared to question or attest the laws and actions that Louis authorized. Lastly, to prevent the public from revolting as they did in his youth, he used the military to crush revolts. The standardization of the military meant they could more quickly and efficiently stop all uprisings. Therefore, Louis placed those with the most power within France under his control so then he directed his attentions abroad.
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To further expand his influence in Europe, Louis went on a series of military campaigns to conquer new territories. Louis directed his armed forces to expand his eastern borders so to better protect his capital. To execute this aim, he used direct force against Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, and to undermine their influence in Europe. Once the military subjugated a new territory, the incorporation and restructure of their governments rested in the presents of the French armies and Louis’ war minister Louvois. This ensured that the nobility and governing bodies in these lands dare not rebel and that continuous revenue flowed into France. Through the great force of Louis’ military foreign powers learned to fear his might. The result, Louis only needed to threaten to invade for other governments to secede to his demands. In the geopolitical stage of Europe, all other actors fell to the lead and strength of Louis XIV with his military beside him. Louis XIV used the military as a tool to consolidate power within both the state and abroad through incentive, intimidation, and force.
On the topic of Louis XIV and absolutism in France during his reign, scholars tend to focus on the man behind the mask of grandeur. By this I mean that they attempt to understand the sort of man that brought France to a golden age of culture and influence. The events, interactions, and actions of Louis XIV remains the central focus for these scholars. If not the man, scholars then have approached this subject by examining Louis’ court and how the members of the nobility interacted in Versailles. Since Versailles restricted the lives of the nobility to the life of the king, and to his watchful eye of scrutiny. An example of this is James Eugene Farmer’s book Versailles and the court under Louis XIV, which examines these social interactions. In extent, these scholars research how Versailles served to reduce the influence of the nobility. Other scholars then inspect the whole system of the absolute state, and how the Louis XIV, his ministers, and the other branches of government reacted with one another. But they lack any overarching thesis as a major factor that created and maintained the absolute monarchy.
As for this specific research question of how did the military serve Louis XIV to create and maintain his absolute state, scholars, such as Carl Ekberg in his book The failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War, use an operational history approach. The perceptive of operational history is a restrictive approach that simply takes a careful examination of military structures and the decisions made on the battlefield. Thus, these scholars look at how did the dragoon, infantry, and cavalry regiments hierarchical structure function under Louis’ direction, especially on the front-lines. For this reason, they often ignore the social ramifications on the greater part of society. This is to say that these scholars tend ignore the economic, social, and political role that the military served in Louis’ consolidation of power. By doing this they fail to recognize the overwhelming effect that the military had on society as a whole and other effects the military had as a social institution off the field.
To address the aspects that other scholars have ignored in approaching this specific question, I seek to focus on the sociopolitical ramifications of military action. By this I must ask how the military altered the fabric of society and other social institutions? Also, in changing sociopolitical patterns in France, how did this consolidate power to Louis XIV? In uncovering the innerworkings of this relationship between Louis, the military, society, and other social institutions, my paper will again a new, unexplored perceptive. This being a war and society perceptive as oppose to an operational history or economic perceptive of Louis’ absolute monarchy. Moreover, I ask how this relationship affected both France and the whole of Europe? This is an important question to ask for few scholars propose a single institution to be responsible for Louis’ power. But, none focus how it changed the social fabric of both France and the rest of the continent, as they tend on focusing on just one. Thus, the final work serves to give a new perceptive on a frequently studied topic.
Absolute power is to be in a position in which one can impose their will upon society and shape it as they wish. For this to be possible none can have the power nor the resolve to hinder the designs of the ruler. In extent, Louis XIV needed to further reduce the powers of the nobility. The reason for this rests in the social structure of Medieval Europe, which tied the might of the king to the loyalty of the lords that pledged their fealty.[3] In times of war, the lords raised armies from the knights and peasantry of their lands. In effect the men that fought remained loyal to their lords, the ones that protected their lands and welfare, not to the kings they fought for.[4] To maintain ties with the king and lords, they married into each other’s families. Through this ensured the continued loyalty of the nobility to the king in the short-run, in the long-run this meant that these nobles had a right to the throne. During the seventeenth century, these nobles remained as landed elites that had the loyalty the armies from their regions of influence, and laid claim to the throne. In this way, the nobility represented a threat to the king’s power and authority, and through their influence could, as they often did, defy the king.
To address the issue of the nobility’s influence over matters of the state, Louis XIV formed a solution to reduce the power of the landed elite. The standardization and centralization of the structure of the military served as the solution to the nobility question. This standing army placed Louis at the head as the main authority of the French military. In effect, all operations and orders came from him. To guarantee that all went smoothly, Louis delegated powers to his Secretary of War Francois-Michel le Tellier. He managed and organized the armies both in times of peace and war. The officers served as the middle men that led the regiments, but took their orders from Louvois and Louis. The members of the nobility composed the ranks of the officer core. This tradition stemmed from the Medieval structure of lords and knights leading the subdivisions. Louis preyed on this tradition of honor to reduce influence of the landed elite.
Louis used the concepts of honor and glory to develop a military culture among the nobility to monopolize their loyalty. Since the Medieval period, the landed elite maintained the belief in chivalrous behavior. This attitude enforced the idea that a gentleman must be courageous in the face of adversity. An individual’s prestige and title demanded that these ideas of honor be personified in one’s actions. To demonstrate and prove their bravery, young members of the aristocracy aimed to join the military, as this profession allowed them to do so.[5] Knowing that the nobility would do anything at a chance to achieve glory, Louis, facilitated by Louvois, made it that all officer positions would be administered by the king. This meant that for a noble to obtain an office of command they had to be personally selected for the position.[6] By doing this, only those that Louis felt demonstrated the greatest level of loyalty could have their chance at glory. To reward those that exhibited outstanding devotion on the battlefield, by maintaining their regiments, or giving complete obedience, Louis gave monetary gifts, promotions, and metals.[7] For an officer to receive a metal served as the ultimate form of honor, as it proved their valor. By manipulating the nobles through their shared values, Louis bred loyalty among his ranks.
Furthermore, the positions that a candidate would receive remained tied to one’s social rank and prestige. This meant that higher offices remained reserved for those of high status and wealth, while lower positions reserved for those of lesser social rank. However, to reduce the independence of these officers in 1675 Louis implemented the ordre de tableau.[8] Thus, promotions would be given to the most senior candidate out of the pool of individuals of equal social rank. In this way, a position went to the most experienced of eligible candidates, and no position would be passed to one’s offspring. The ordre de tableau secured that the officers that held the positions of marshals and generals, positions that commanded the wartime military, had the necessary experience.[9] These seasoned soldiers formed the ranks of those that received their orders directly from Louis. All factors considered, Louis XIV formed a centralized chain of command composed of devoted and experienced of nobles.
By altering the financing system of the military, Louis tied the success of his officers to their compliance to his authority. Once a nobleman became part of the officer corps, Louis required them to outfit their regiments. This extended to such provisions as weapons, uniforms, and food for soldiers. The “maintenance system” as John A. Lynn dubbed it in his book Giant of the Grand Siecle, resulted from the fact that officers often purchased their offices so they had to maintain them as one would with one’s own personal property.[10] The office that carried the greatest weight rested with the position of colonial. This is because their office remained high enough that financial support became required, and yet low enough that they could not pass the burden to a lower office.[11] The practice of making the nobility pay to maintain the regiments served to reduce their capital by reinvesting it back into the state. For this allowed the state to create an expanded, professionalized army that benefited the state without the state having to pay in full.
However, the price of honor and glory often cost the aristocratic officers their wealth and their lives. Often officers had to resort to asking for funds from their relatives or take out loans so that they could maintain their ranks and office. As is the nature of war, many of these officers would die on the battlefield, leaving their families in a state of grief and financial disarray.[12] To support the continuation of Louis’ system of control over these officers he created a system of financial support. The officers received funds in the form of grants, bonuses, and salaries that Louis tied to their compliance to the requirements imposed on their offices. For example, officers would receive monetary funds for recruiting new soldier to their regiments. This is also connected to the bonus that officers collected for having full ranks.[13] At times officers, would abuse these systems by recruiting inadequate men to their ranks and spending their revenue on themselves. Louis even, in the 1650’s, increased the salaries of his troops and shortened the time between payments so satisfy the needs of his officers.[14] To ensure that officers used these incentives for maintaining their troops properly, Louis utilized a body of inspectors to review and ensure that regiments followed regulations.[15] If they did not, then funds would be taken from these unsatisfactory regiments. Thus, aristocratic officers had to obey Louis’ regulations and policy. By creating a monetary system based on an officer’s compliance to regulation, nobles became financially tied to the state. For the true price for their honor and glory came in the form compliance and obedience to the authority of the king.
If these systems of incentives, both financial and honor, ever failed to persuade the nobility to heel to royal authority and regulation, punishment brought them into the fold. The standardization of the military came with the standard of behavior that professionalism expected. This is to say that Louis XIV did not desire his officers or soldiers to commit such actions as extortion, fraud, or pillaging. Louis reduced the amount of extorting and pillaging of soldiers through the Tax of Violence, which cut the pay of those who committed the crime.[16] If the disobedience had been truly great, the perpetrator(s) would be stripped of their office. This punishment had been viewed by officers as truly severe, as this served as a great dishonor. As Lynn explains, this had been a common practice as from 1686 to 1693, the span of five years, 448 officers had been stripped of their position of command.[17] The acts of cowardice and desertion received the punishment of execution. This served as a deterrent to those who would do the same, but more common had been the act of mutilation. The cutting of the nose or ear showed that these individuals deserted their post, which placed them at the fringes of society.[18] Thus, systems of incentives and punishments allowed Louis tied most of the nobility to the state through the military.
The power to rule is to have the ability to dictate the law of the land without the hindrance of other bodies of government, even the legislative branch. The parliaments within France served the purpose of proposal, passing, and registration of laws. Since the parliaments controlled the legislative process, they had the ability to block any form of law. For this reason, parliamentary powers had long since been the bane of royal authority. In the event that the king desired to issue their own law(s), the parliaments, as often had been the case, would block them. In other cases, they would totally ignore the new legislations that the monarchs presented. The hindering of new legislation endured as an issue for all monarchs before and after Louis XIV. By doing this, the parliaments of France ensured that the king had limited power and influence over the law of the land.
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Once Louis XIV dealt with the nobility, he turned his attention to the parliaments that had so long plagued the French throne. For Louis XIV to stop the parliaments’ ability to limit the passing of his own laws, he had to reduce legislative powers of the parliaments. In 1667, Louis executed this through article IV of title I of a new ordinance that he registered at the Parliament of Paris.[19] This decree served to increase the effectiveness of the lit de justice and thereby reducing the parliaments’ ability to block the registration of Louis’ laws. The lit de justice is rooted in the 1400s act of the king visiting the tribunals in an attempt to oblige them to register laws. The actual action did not become official until Henry III and continued to be used by his successors. Henry’s successors argued that because the state had been under a state of emergency the “medieval principle” of necessitas legem non habet could be implored, which gave the king extraordinary powers.[20] Since Louis’ reign suffered from frequent conflicts, extraordinary powers remained vested in him during his rule and used through the lit de justice. In effect, Article IV made it that all laws that are presented during the lit de justice had to be registered and enforced by the parliaments.[21] Thus, Louis XIV took the parliamentary powers that had been such a nuisance and now had to enforce them.
Though Louis used article IV to create laws without the parliaments’ consent, he now needed show that he would use force if the parliaments disobeyed. Louis XIV managed to limit the parliaments’ ability to undermine his will through title I. Even in Louis’ memoirs he stated that “the Parliaments had hitherto raised difficulties in the execution of [his] orders in council” and that they “received…orders by which [he] prohibited the continuance of [such] abuses.”[22] But this did not mean that the parliaments would not oppose it. This then required Louis to give a show of strength that the members of the parliaments would not soon forget. Such a display occurred in May 1669, when the Parliament of Paris protested to an edict by Louis that limited their ability to grant hereditary nobility.[23] In reaction to this Louis called a lit de justice in August 13, 1669 to instate a new set of forced registrations. The importance of this event is in the actions of Louis on that day. For before his arrival to the Palace of Justice, location of the lit de justice, he had placed “units of French and Swiss guards” throughout streets leading to its gate.[24] Once Louis arrived, he entered with his soldiers and registered his edicts. Then, without warning he left with his soldiers.[25] This event demonstrates the role that the military played in intimidating parliamentary opposition into submission. Without Louis’ use of military presence, the Parliament of Paris would not have kneeled to his will. The members of the Parliament of Paris learned that the might of the French military could and shall destroy them if necessary. For they then learned that the king could quite easily enter the tribunals and bring about their permit end. This message of intimidation ultimately served to place fear in hearts and minds of the members of parliament for what the king would make his armies do if they ever disagree. For the swords of Louis’ armies gave force to the words of title I of his new ordinance.
The next blow came in the form of the declaration of 1673, which legally finished what title I started. The declaration served to remove all the loopholes that existed in title I. It made it so that the first president of each parliament had to call a session within three days of learning the new laws. Furthermore, all new edicts had to be approved and registered in the same session.[26] These adjustments made it so that no delays could be made and none could speak out against them. The declaration of 1673 served to further consolidate legislative powers and reduce those of the parliaments. However, this led to increase resentment among the members of the parliaments, to the point that intimidation lost its force to some of the opposition. For Louis, the answer to this issue once more led him to the force of his armies.
Even the fear instilled by intimidation can only do so much, for there are those whom require a stronger hand. Though Louis XIV made it that all parliaments had to register new legislation, this did not mean that the parliaments would enforce them. By not enforcing the new edicts of the king, the parliaments showed their defiance to Louis’ authority. This defiance is seen in the Parliament of Rennes’ lack of enforcement of fiscal laws that came to them for registry before and after 1673. These deeds reached their climax when in March of 1675 an uprising occurred in Bordeaux in reaction to taxes imposed on stamped paper, tobacco, and pewter.[27] The uprising in Bordeaux led to one in Rennes in April. To deal with this, the king sent some of his regiments from the Rhine to crush these uprisings. Then Louis XIV punished the Parliament of Rennes and the Parliament of Bordeaux for their role in aiding the uprising. The punishment for the members of these parliaments came in the form of forced relocation to small towns where they would have no influence.[28] In these places, they remained in reach of the king’s armies to severely punish them if they ever disobeyed again. The whole affair served as an example for any others that would dare do the same. In this the military served an important tool of controlling these unruly parliaments. For it crushed the revolts that they brought about to undermine the fiscal laws of the king. In doing so it enforced the laws that the parliaments so purposely challenged. Furthermore, it enabled Louis to display to all other parliaments that he will gladly use the force of his armies to enforce his intimidation tactics. Thus, the parliaments of France, just as with the nobility, fell to the might of the military and the will of Louis XIV.
The instigators of the Fronde, the nobility and the parliaments, learned through incentive, intimidation, and punishment to heed the will of the king. Yet Louis still needed to deal with a far more dangerous foe, the people of France. The loyalty of the people is a fickle thing as it could change at a moment’s notice and without warning. Louis learned first-hand, as mentioned previously, when a mob of residents of Paris stormed the palace during the Fronde. From that day forward, Louis realized that the power of the mob had to be repressed the very moment an insurrection occurs. For Louis believed that only God could judge a king, which meant “that however wicked a prince maybe, rebellion on the part of his subjects cannot but be criminal.”[29] Even more so, he stated that “a Prince should employ…persuasive than coercive means,” but that if necessary a ruler must “cause himself to be indispensably obeyed.”[30] Thus, a ruler is required to maintain peace within his lands because the people do not have the right to either judge or rebel against the king, at least from Louis’ perceptive.
Though Louis stated that it would be better to use non-forceful means to subdue rebellions, this did not mean that he did not resort to violence to repress his unruly subjects. The reign of Louis XIV brought about several wars: The War of Devolution (1667-1668), the Dutch War (1672-1678), the War of the Great Alliance (1687-1697), and the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). These wars demanded large sums of revenue, food, and manpower, which placed a great burden on the French people. The people of France faced new fiscal policies that imposed more taxes, the need to feed Louis’ armies resulted in a reduction in the food supply, and the emotional pain from the death of family members.[31] However, these impositions became common place for the French, so they would usually revolt only when events such as plague and famine increased their suffering. Thus, at various intervals in certain areas of France, the people grew restless of these impositions to the point that they rebelled. In 1661, the French suffered a famine because of a poor harvest and bad weather. The famine led the people of Montauban, Dieppe, Provence, and La Rochelle to revolt against the conditions that they suffered.[32] Other revolts occurred in 1674 in Bordeaux that would spread to Guyenne and Rennes. These events remain tied to the factors that excited them and those that ended them.[33] The burden of famine in 1661 and of new taxes in 1674 caused the people to rebel in the hopes of ending their suffering. The factor that led to their ends came in the form of immediate military intervention and suppression of these insurgences. By quickly repressing these uprisings, Louis XIV prevented the emergence of another situation like the Fronde.
The speed and sheer force that the French armies acted in stopping revolts from growing out of control and threating Louis’ authority is rooted in the standardization of the military. As the head of the military, as with all things of state, Louis created legislative measures to regularize his armies. Under his reign, Louis made it that all his soldiers have colorized uniforms and various emblems to symbolize a soldier’s rank and branch affiliation.[34] The visual stratification of the military companied the rigorous drills and training to instill discipline and order among the troops. This reduced the hesitation and increase the precision of his troops in crushing revolts, as they now focused on their orders and not that they were attacking their own people. Also, in 1667, Louis invested in the “breeding of horses,” to give his “enlarged [Dragoon Corps]” and his Cavalry Corps both an advantage of speed and numbers.[35] Revolts could now be reached much quicker by these units, to crush them before they grew out of control.
Furthermore, Louis made his troops more capable of crushing revolts by further regulation. In 1671, to make his regiments far deadlier, he “instituted the use of bayonets” for his musket units.[36] In the event that a peasant attacked a soldier with their melee weapons, a soldier could use their bayonets to strike after they had fired a round at the rioters. Then, Louis established “artillery schools” at Douai, Metz, and Strasbourg to train some of his regiments on how to use artillery.[37] These units could attack the enemy, the rioters, by bombarding them from afar and at the same time strike fear in their hearts so that they would be disoriented. Additionally, in 1688, Louis formed thirty militias so that these regiments continue their work in the fields, but be activated at a moment’s notice.[38] The militias, if needed, would be activated to suppress any uprisings near the fields they cultivated. By 1672 Louis managed to increase his military might from “a hundred and eighty thousand regular troops” to “four hundred and fifty thousand” soldiers and created the beginnings of a strong navy.[39] All to be deployed at any time from their fortified garrisons and fortresses to repress revolts with ease. Thus, through standardization of the military, Louis made it so that no insurrection would last for long and would discourage any future uprisings.
The documentation of revolts during the reign of Louis XIV demonstrates the effectiveness of the military’s ability to maintain order. The memoirs of Louis XIV serves as a fine example of the military’s effectiveness. For when he maintains insurrections during his reign, he but briefly mentions ones in 1661 in passing to the Dauphin of France.[40] This is a telling thing in two regards. The first is that these uprisings most likely had been minor ones in which the military, at the early stages of standardizing, had easily suppressed. The second is that Louis likely did not want to focus on these events as he felt they took away from his achievements. Nevertheless, the fact that Louis XIV did not feel it necessary to warn the Dauphin of the threat that a revolt could present if it ensued meant that no such threat existed. This is even more telling when one considers the events that occurred to Louis in his youth when the Parisian people, in a state of revolt, stormed the palace. It can be determined that Louis probably did not feel that uprisings served as a major, if at all, a threat to his successors’ rule. The only factor that could contribute to this frame of mind is the military. Since, Louis had created a regular army that composed itself of the most advance tactics, equipment, and size, none could challenge it, especially a bunch of peasants. Moreover, the fact the no specific revolt had been worth mentioning to the Dauphin, meant that no revolt occurred during Louis’ reign that could not be stopped with ease. Thus, Louis had created a force that could not be stopped by any form of oppression; not the nobility, the parliaments, and above all not the people of France.
To dominate one’s country with a powerful military is to be able to impose one’s own will on the whole continent. Such sentiment embodies the reign of Louis XIV and the wars in which he demonstrated the full might of his armies. By limiting the powers of the nobility and the parliaments, and subduing the people of France, Louis consolidated all power within the state into his hands. This meant that he gained the power introduce new legislation and both impose new taxes and redirect revenue to whatever he please. These powers that now rested in the crown had been delegated to Louis’ ministers so to facilitate in the execution of his desires. The most important of these ministers for Louis’ desires for territorial expansion had been Colbert and Louvois. Each of these men served to support and expand Louis’ armies into a superior fighting force comparatively to the rest of Europe. Colbert served as Louis finance minister, which meant that he moved and allotted funds to support and increase the standing armies. Louvois, war minister, continued the efforts of his father, Le Tellier, in expanding and training Louis’ military to become the first of its size and training. Louis’ consolidation of power within the state and the support of his ministers served to create a fighting force that allowed Louis to impose his will beyond his borders.
The conflict between Spain and its territorial possessions against the might of France came to be Louis’ first show of strength. In the heart of the War of Devolution, as it would be known, had been rooted in a war that ended eight years earlier. In 1659, the Spanish and the French signed the Treaty of Pyrenees to end a war between them that raged for twenty-four years.[41] The terms of the treaty granted France Spanish territory, but more importantly it promised Maria Theresa’s, the Spanish king’s daughter, hand in marriage. Upon marrying Louis, Maria renounced her claim to the Spanish throne and Louis allowed it because in exchange Maria’s dowry amounted to fifty-thousand gold pieces.[42] However, this promised amount had never been paid because an economic downturn that struck Spain. When Philip IV, the king of Spain, died in 1665 and since the dowry had not been paid Louis used this as an excuse to lay claim to the Spanish Netherlands.[43] Louis quickly doubled his troops from forty-thousand to eighty-thousand and then launched his attack in 1667.[44] The pure force of Louis’ regiments conquered all lands that laid in their path. This led the English and the Dutch to stop their trade war with one another and join Sweden in 1668, which formed the Triple Alliance.[45] The fear of Louis’ expansion also caused the Spanish to end their war with the Portuguese. Thus, Louis faced oppression from all sides, but did not falter in his efforts, as he made a secret treaty with Leopold I, the Holy Roman Emperor.[46] Since it had been believed that Charles II of Spain was ill, the treaty promised Louis the Spanish Netherlands in the event of his death. Having this up his sleeve, Louis entered the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668, which granted him parts of the Spanish Netherlands, such as Lille.[47]
The War of Devolution revealed a great deal about the state of the military at the beginning of Louis’ standardization. During this time, France experienced a great level of economic prosperity. For this reason, the expansion, preparation, and supplying of Louis’ armies did not impact the economy negatively. In fact, by the end of the war no deficit had been created and a minimum amount of lives had been lost in battle.[48] It is apparent that the French military did not encounter much resistance on the side of their adversaries based on their lack of losses. This is especially true of the Spanish because the size and equipment of their forces, which resulted from Spain’s poor economic situation that prevented them from better supporting their forces, particularly for a long period of time. Furthermore, the fact that the Dutch, England, and Sweden put aside their differences to unite against the French is quite telling. It shows that they recognized that each alone could not hope to stand against the full force of France, much less repel it. It is also important to distinguish that Louis believed that he could have won the war with his forces as is expressed in his memoirs. But that he chose to stop because of his secret treaty with Leopold I would be more cost effective in the long run. Lastly, Spain’s willingness to give up its strongholds and lands that the French armies conquered in the north further affirms that they knew they could not continue the war against such a powerful foe. Therefore, the War of Devolution is a prime example of how Louis used the brute force of his military as a tool to force and intimidate his enemies into submission, and their inability to resist.
Four years after the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, Louis once again attacked the Dutch Republic. After the end of the War of Devolution, Louis felt that he had been cheated out of a glorious victory. Though it had been his choice to continue or end the war, he desired to demonstrate his might by taking Holland. In preparation for his war, Louis and Charles II of England sign the Treaty of Dover.[49] Charles promised to commit to the war effort against Holland and Louis would pay him a yearly sum. This meant that in 1672 the Dutch Republic faced Louis’ one hundred and twenty thousand regular soldiers and England’s naval fleet, while the Dutch had only thirty thousand men.[50] Louis’ troops crossed into the Rhine and from there entered Holland. By 1673, the French took Maastricht, the Alsatian cities, Trier, and Franche-Comte to name but a few of Louis’ major conquests.[51] The rapid advancement of Louis’ troops, Charles’ support, and the poor state of the Dutch military caused foreign powers to intervene. The Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and Lorraine formed a coalition to stop Louis’ progression. Once again Louis faced a war from all sides, this as well as an economic downturn, led England in 1674 to make peace with the Dutch with the Treaty of Westminster.[52] Being confronted by four enemies, deserted by his major ally, and a financial deficit at home, Louis signed the Treaty of Nijmegen. The treaty gave Louis the territories of the duchy of Frenche-Comte, parts of Flanders, and Hainault.[53] Ultimately, the Dutch war tested Louis’ military, and it proved its ability to serve Louis’ desire for supremacy.
During the time of the Dutch War, the French armed forces had seen the fruits of their standardization. Louis in the span of a few years managed to produce triple the size of his armies and during the war he quadruple them in size. As previously mentioned by 1672 Louis had introduced the bayonet, increased his dragoons and cavalry, and developed his artillery units.[54] This enabled Louis to, within a year, have occupied and conquered expansive amounts of land without suffering serious losses. The Dutch War truly shows the difference between Louis’ troops and that of other European nations. In both 1667 and 1672, the Spain and the Dutch proved too weak to confront Louis’ forces. Their forces had been ill-equipped, poorly trained, their fortresses dilapidated, and approximately thirty thousand in size. This is further supported by the fact that an alliance composed by the most influential European countries had to be formed once again to stop France’s expansion. The trend seen here is that Louis’ armies out-matched the standard forces of other European countries. The result is a situation in which Louis, once again, used the military as a tool of force so that he could impose his will on to other nations.
All these factors considered, the question of why Louis retreated to France during the Dutch War seems puzzling. When Louis began the Dutch War, he believed that the conflict would have come to a quick end. He believed this to be true because of the poor condition of the Dutch forces and the fact that he had both the support and numbers to overwhelm the Dutch. This did not happen because of William of Orange, leader of the Dutch, refused to give land to Louis. He instead flooded the lands Louis occupied by opening the dykes that served to drain the area.[55] This limited Louis’ movements and caused him to lose ground. The other factor is that when Louis had the chance to take Holland he did not act and instead the coalition took this opportunity as he had spread his forces too thin. Lastly, the French economy served as the most important factor that forced Louis to end his campaign. With the Dutch War lasting longer than expected and that France’s enemies stopped all export trade, France’s gross domestic product decreased. To counter this Colbert increased taxation, but this led to revolts that spread Louis’ troop even thinner because they had to be diverted to crush the rebellions.[56] Louis then could not afford to maintain both the state and the war. The significance of addressing France’s retreat is in recognizing that all these factors needed to occur to stop the French. If none or only one of these factors had afflicted France than it would not be likely that Louis would had to have settled for the Treaty of Nijmegen. In effect, Louis’ use of force served him well in foreign affairs, though it had its limits, it still allowed him to consolidate power like none other.
The next major and final war for possession of Spanish territories, came after the death of the king of Spain in 1700. In many ways, the War of Spanish Succession served as a continuation of the War of the Great Alliance (1687-1697) as both began over the question of who would take the Spanish throne. This war ended with the Treaty of Rijswijk, which did not answer the question that caused the war to begin. The War of Spanish of Succession began in 1702 after the death of the childless Charles II of Spain and his giving the throne to Louis’ grandson Philip, the Duke of Anjou.[57] The countries of Europe fear this, as is seen when William III addressed parliament stating that “if you do in good earnest desire to see England hold the balance of Europe…it will appear by your right improving the present opportunity.”[58] In fear of the loss of the balance of power, the countries of England, the Dutch Republic, and the Holy Roman Empire formed their coalition once more. Early in the war, the combined forces of the French (possessing the largest and most power military on the continent) and the Spanish had great success. They had even repelled two invasions by Anglo-Dutch forces at Cadiz in Spain and at Cartagena in the Americas.[59] However, famine and an economic downturn placed a large burden on the state. Even the Duke of Saint-Simon stated that “the need for money indeed made itself felt so much at [that] time.”[60] To make matters worse, the Portuguese broke their promise to Louis to remain neutral, and allowed the Great Alliance to enter with their troops. Moreover, in 1703 the suspicions of Jérôme Phélypeaux, Louis’ Secretary of the State of the Navy, had been confirmed when Savoy too abandoned Louis.[61] These and many more setbacks plagued Louis’ rate of success in the War of Spanish Succession.
Regardless of these setbacks, Louis managed to secure his grandson as the king of Spain, and expanded France’s influence. From the very beginning, the Great Alliance had been doomed to fail and lose to Louis’ French and Spanish forces. In 1702, William III, previously known as William of Orange, died and in 1705 Emperor Leopold I died as will.[62] Both figures acted as powerful statesmen and rulers that know Louis’ tactics well and how to take advantage of his weaknesses. These deaths struck serious blows in terms of leadership for England and the Holy Roman Empire. It is true that Louis suffered from a series of hindrances that threatened his war effort, but this did not stop Louis from pressing forward. Since the state of France experienced high unemployment and a lack of revenue because of it, the French people joined the military in unprecedented numbers.[63] This gave the French people employment and wages, which in turn gave revenue to the state and above all renewed manpower to Louis’ armies. In effect, Louis continued with the war, and broke-off peace negotiations with the Great Alliance. The greatest blow that shook the coalition occurred when in 1711 when Emperor Charles III, son of Leopold I, took the Holy Roman throne.[64] After the death of Charles II of Spain, the Habsburgs claimed that the Spanish throne belonged to Charles III. The result, with the coalition’s choice for the Spanish crown now on the Holy Roman throne, he could no longer take Spain or its lands, and Philip’s claim grew stronger. The final hit came when the English withdrew because the new party in power, the Tory party, did not want to continue paying for a now baseless war. Thus, both the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) and the Treaty of Rastadt (1714) ended the war with Louis’ grandson on the Spanish throne[65].
Louis’ final war gave the Bourbon family and himself increased influence and power within Europe thanks to the efforts of his armed forces. The French military proved in the War of Spanish Succession that it could success in the face of great adversity. It managed to fend multiple invasions both on and off the European continent. Also, the French stood against, yet again, another coalition of countries and their armies. Meaning that both France and its allies once again faced forces from all sides, while their trade cut off from much of the world. Though many loses had been taken at such battles as the Battle of Blenheim and that Louis’ armies suffered from great exhaustion, the French held out for twelve years. Additionally, it served as a tool to maintain order within France by providing employment to those unemployed because of France’s financial crisis. This directed the people’s negative sentiments into greater manpower for the war effort. In all this, the military provided Louis with a member of his family on the Spanish throne. Along with Spain, Louis’ grandson gained control over Spanish lands in the Americas. This arrangement required Philip to renounce his claim to the throne of France, and gave the rest of Spain’s possessions to the Holy Roman Empire. However, the arrangement now gave Louis great influence over Spain and its lands through Philip and strengthened the bonds between the countries. Starting for the War of Devolution to the War of Spanish Succession, the military served to give Louis what he wanted the most, expansion into and control of Spanish lands. In this way, by using the brute force his military Louis tipped the balance of power in his favor.
Hence, Louis XIV used the military as a tool to consolidate power through incentives, intimidation, and force. The military created a dramatic change in France comparatively to before the Fronde. Before the reign of Louis XIV, the nobility had great wealth and lands that gave them much influence over the state. The medieval practice of raising armies from their own lands gave the nobility power over the men in the armies. Parliaments in France served as the main legislative body and often blocked the efforts of kings to pass laws. The peasantry revolted against the king’s rule during difficult times and the state had been limited in its ability to suppress their insurrections. But, by centralizing the military Louis gained the ability to limit and reduce the powers of the nobility, the parliaments, and the people. Louis cultivated a military culture among the nobles based on honor and glory as an incentive for them to join his armies and display their loyal in battle. Then, by changing the state’s finance practices he forced aristocratic officers to heed royal authority by binding their salaries and grants to their compliance to regulation. Louis also used the threat of punishment, such as taking one’s office, to compel the nobles to obey for the alternative had been dishonor. Louis passed new ordinances and declarations to increase his legislative powers while reducing that of the parliaments. To ensure that the parliaments obeyed, Louis intimidated them with shows of military strength and used actual force if intimidation ever failed. By increasing the size of his armies, their level of discipline, and bettering their training, Louis turned them into a force to be reckoned with. By doing, they became better suited to punish and crush all subjects who rebelled against the kings’ authority. In result, a centralized French state where all powers rested with the king and the agitators of the Fronde reduced to mere servants to their king’s rule.
With Louis’ state now under his complete rule thanks to the military’s efforts, he turned to the rest of the continent to expand his borders. Through his wars, Louis demonstrated the strength of his armies by taking on most of Europe. By using the sheer force of his military, Louis conquered territories from the Spanish with ease. His military used their numbers and training to take lands in the Spanish Netherlands, the Duchy of Frenche-Comte, and parts of northern Spain. In each war, Louis humiliated the opposition by facing their combined forces, despite any setbacks that occurred, come out victorious. In fear of Louis’ armies and their tenacity to continue their campaigns, the countries of Europe always awarded Louis with land, even though they did not desire to. This is apparent in the treaties that end each of Louis’ wars in which the opposition awarded Louis with new lands. The greatest prize, the throne of Spain, awarded to Louis’ grandson and placed a Bourbon upon the throne. In doing so, Louis gained more power to influence the whole of Europe, while his enemies could do nothing but limit his influence to a little degree. In using the military as an institution and a weapon, Louis imposed his absolute authority in France and expanded his influence abroad.
[1] Retz, Jean François Paul de Gondi de. 1899. Memoirs of Jean François Paul de Gondi, cardinal de Retz. Boston
[2] Ibid
[3] Lynn, John A. 1997. Giant of the grand siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg.5-6
[4] Ibid
[5] Lynn, John A. 1997. Giant of the grand siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pg. 251-252
[6] Ibid, Pg. 259-260
[7] Ibid, Pg. 259-260
[8] Rowlands, Guy. The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest 1661–1701. Cambridge University Press, 2002, Pg. 298-299
[9] Ibid
[10] Lynn, John A. 1997. Giant of the grand siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[11] Rowlands, Guy. The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest 1661–1701. Cambridge University Press, 2002, Pg. 237-239
[12] Ibid, Pg. 248-254
[13] Ibid, Pg. 204-212
[14] Ibid, Pg. 201-202
[15] Lynn, John A. 1997. Giant of the grand siècle: the French Army, 1610-1715. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pg. 188-199
[16] Ibid, Pg.279-281
[17] Ibid, Pg. 279-281
[18] Rowlands, Guy. The Dynastic State and the Army under Louis XIV: Royal Service and Private Interest 1661–1701. Cambridge University Press, 2002, Pg. 209-210
[19] Hurt, John J. Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority. Manchester University Press, 2002. Pg. 17
[20] Ibid, Pg. 5
[21] Ibid, Pg. 20
[22] Louis, and Jean Raymond, comte de Gain de Montagnac. 1806. Memoirs of Lewis the Fourteenth. London, Pg.11
[23] Hurt, John J. Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority. Manchester University Press, 2002. Pg. 24
[24] Ibid
[25] Ibid
[26] Ibid, Pg. 57-58
[27] Hurt, John J. Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority. Manchester University Press, 2002. Pg. 56-57
[28] Ibid
[29] Louis, and Jean Raymond, comte de Gain de Montagnac. 1806. Memoirs of Lewis the Fourteenth. London, Pg. 337
[30] Ibid, Pg. 32-33
[31] Hurt, John J. Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority. Manchester University Press, 2002. Pg. 55-58
[32] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, pg. 69
[33] Hurt, John J. Louis XIV and the Parlements: The Assertion of Royal Authority. Manchester University Press, 2002. Pg. 56-57
[34] Voltaire, and J. H. Brumfitt. 1965. The age of Louis XIV, and other selected writings. New York: Twayne Publishers, pg. 139-141
[35] Ibid
[36] Ibid
[37] Ibid
[38] Ibid
[39] Ibid
[40] Louis, and Jean Raymond, comte de Gain de Montagnac. 1806. Memoirs of Lewis the Fourteenth. London, pg. 32
[41] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, Pg. 73
[42] Ibid, Pg. 104-107
[43] Ibid, Pg. 104-107
[44] Ibid, Pg.104-107
[45] Ibid, Pg. 109-111
[46] Ibid, Pg. 110
[47] Ibid, Pg. 111
[48] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, Pg. 112
[49] Ibid, Pg. 113
[50]Ekberg, Carl J. 1979. The failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War. Chapel Hill, Pg. 14-15
[51] Ibid, Pg. 45
[52] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, pg. 11
[53] Ekberg, Carl J. 1979. The failure of Louis XIV's Dutch War. Chapel Hill, Pg. 181-183
[54] Voltaire, and J. H. Brumfitt. 1965. The age of Louis XIV, and other selected writings. New York: Twayne Publishers, pg. 139-141
[55] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, pg. 11
[56] Ibid, pg. 133
[57] Ibid, Pg. 231-235
[58] William of England. King William of England Addresses Parliament on the French Question, 31 December 1701: AMDOCS: Documents for the Study of American History
[59] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, pg. 247-248
[60] Saint-Simon, Louis De Rouvroy. The Memoirs of the Duke of Saint-Simon on the Reign of Louis XIV and the Regency. Translated by Bayle St. John. London
[61] Louis XIV, and Jérôme Phélypeaux. "Archim Correspondence between Louis XIV and Pontchartrain Secretary of State for the Navy." Accueil Ministère - Ministère de la Culture et de la Communication
[62] Goubert, Pierre. 1970. Louis XIV and twenty million Frenchmen. New York, pg. 14-15
[63] Farmer, James Eugene. 1906. Versailles and the court under Louis XIV. London: Eveleigh Nash, Pg. 324
[64] Ibid, pg. 14-15
[65] Ibid, Pg. 14-15
Through Louis XIV's use of the military he brought both the state of France and the European Continent under his influence